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In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or chaotic solution is often perceived as a shortcoming of the corresponding game dynamic because (Nash) equilibrium play is supposed to be robust and persistent behaviour; any other behaviour in nature is deemed transient. Consequently, there is a lack of attempt to connect the non-fixed point solutions with the game theoretic concepts. In this talk, we shall present a way to render game-theoretic meaning to the periodic solutions. We shall also witness a use of information-theoretic concepts in providing the aforementioned game-theoretic meaning.
Based on: J. Theo. Bio. 497, 110288 (2020); Chaos 30, 121104 (2020); and arXiv:2210.00520v2 (2022).
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